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Abstract The title assumes that there is a difference be-
tween political Utopia and the transhumanist techno-vision.
But if one follows recent publications that promise a renais-
sance of utopia, the transhumanist 21st century figures of the
future are not a disconnected trend running parallel to the
classic utopian discourse since Plato and More; in fact, they
are its consumers. They have incorporated the original uto-
pian potential and thus undergone a transformation beyond
recognition. Yet can this hostile takeover be accepted? The
author aims at answering this question by a comparison of
both approaches focusing on three levels: How should the
anthropological mechanisms, which form the basis of the
utopian and transhumanist approach, be characterised?
Which phenomenologically comprehensible structures of
the world view result from those that they consider as the
optimum for a successful life? Which differences in the
structures of both imagination types can be deduced from
the answers to these questions?
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Introduction: will the classic utopia be replaced
by the modern concept of transhumanism?
The title assumes that there is a difference between political
Utopia and the transhumanist techno-vision. But if one fol-
lows recent publications that promise a renaissance of utopia,
the transhumanist “Zukunftsfiguren des 21. Jahrhunderts
(21st century figures of the future)” [1] are not a disconnected
trend running parallel to the classic utopian discourse since
Plato [2] and More [3]; in fact, they are its consumers.
They have, so to speak, incorporated the original utopian
potential and thus undergone a transformation beyond rec-
ognition. The new bearers of modern utopia are no longer
philosophers like Plato, humanists like More or even nov-
elists like Aldous Huxley [4] and Ursula K. Le Guin [5].
Rather, they are transhumanist engineers and technical
scientists like Eric Drexler [6], Hans Moravec [7], Ray
Kurzweil [8], Marvin Minsky [9], etc. Their versions have
been broken down with the concrete research policies by
scientific journalists and managers like William S. Bainbridge
and Mihail Roco [10].
One would have been able to consider this “hostile take-
over” of the utopian terrain by transhumanism as a mere
fashion trend, had there been no more and no less than a
part of the European identity at stake. This is because
transhumanist techno-visions draw on the popular American
culture of Science Fiction, while the utopian thought has,
since ancient times, profoundly shaped the European con-
ception of man—especially his ability to think of alterna-
tives. It is this competence that demonstrates his dynamism,
which originates from his ability to learn and to correct the
vision of the feasibility of the world as the focus of theHomo
faber by the self-reflection of the Homo sapiens. Those who
are not prepared to surrender themselves without resistance
to a 2,000 year old tradition of thought to the dominance of
Science Fiction would be well advised to take the challenge
it poses seriously. How else can this be done in a meaningful
manner than through systematic comparison between both
traditions of thought?
However, the moment such comparative studies of “tra-
ditions of thought” take utopian and transhumanist intention
as their starting point, their analytical thrust is already clear:
it lies in the field of political theory and history of ideas.
When reconstructing its objects of research, it must be noted
that they generally have anthropological preconditions. They
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outline the framework within which political theorists estab-
lish institutions and standards, which control human actions,
enable transgression in the sense of the New Man and con-
stitute and legitimise supremacy. For our purposes, we need
to consider two levels, which despite being different from the
analytical point of view, are interrelated: the anthropological
dimension and the phenomenological structure of the human
“life-worlds”.
On this assumption, my lecture focuses on three ques-
tions: How should the anthropological mechanisms, which
form the basis of the utopian and transhumanist approach, be
characterised? Which phenomenologically comprehensible
structures of the world view result from those that they
consider as the optimum for a successful life? Which differ-
ences in the structures of both imagination types can be
deduced from the answers to these questions?
The anthropological difference between the chiliastic,
utopian and transhumanist approaches
The theory that the utopian thought is one of the few mo-
nopolies that a human has, which differentiate him from the
animal kingdom, may meet with general agreement. How-
ever, it is controversial how the connection between the basic
constitution of anthropology and the ability to conceive
notional alternatives to the given socio-political status quo
can be conceptualised. What makes human nature constant is
the fact that it is linked to the evolution of its own natural
history. But it can free itself from the fetters that bind it to its
animal existence to the extent that, in order to survive the
struggle for existence, it can create artificial environments
that support and adapt human beings in their openness to the
world (Weltoffenheit). Helmuth Plessner paraphrased this
ability of the human nature with his concept of “eccentric
positionality” [11, pp 288, pp 291, pp 309]. To comprehend
the basic anthropological constitution of man, this category
plays a key role insofar as it constitutes a consequential
mechanism. The evolutionary impulses of his animal nature
do not control man’s tendency to design his existence direct-
ly or in a monocausal manner, but filtered through his sec-
ondary, i.e., socio-cultural nature. This premise could be an
analytical key for explaining why human behaviour appears
to be impressionable by such diverse fictions as chiliastic,
utopian and transhumanist thoughts.
The chiliastic thought (compare [12, pp 157–167] in its
original form in early Christianity, in the middle ages and in
the early modern period presupposes the anthropological
premise that the evolutionary impulse for self-preservation
is “sublimated” by a socio-cultural context, which appears to
be only marginally impregnated by scientific-technological
structures. Analogously, the creation is directly related to a
spiritual transcendence. The stabilisation of man is a result of
the conviction that man is redeemed from his sins and the
doors of God’s kingdom are open to him. In this respect, the
chiliastic practice rejects, in some of its variants, state laws as
well as the institutions of private property and family.
Presupposing a certain distance from the scientific-
technological civilisation, chiliasm exists not only in mono-
theist religions, but also in the nature deities of the Indians,
like those of the Guarini in the primeval forests of Brazil. In
the chiliastic thought, the evolutionary impulse is also mod-
ified by the artificial realities of the second nature of man.
But this is hardly characterised by the dynamics of the
scientific-technological development.
Likewise, the utopian thought is mediatized by the evo-
lutionary impulse of self-preservation. But its sublimation
occurs in a world of artefacts, a world where science and
technology have already rooted themselves deeply. The ap-
propriation of the world through technology was already
well advanced in the early modern period till Thomas More
wrote “Utopia” [3, pp 7–110] in 1516 and till “Neu-Atlantis”
(“New Atlantis”) [13, pp 171–215] by Francis Bacon was
published in 1638: the utopian thought seeks an alternative to
suffering in this world since it recognises in it the causes for
the yearning to have a better future. To find this alternative,
there has to be a modernised reception of the ancient times.
Simultaneously, the resulting Spirit of Doing is strengthened
by the discovery of new worlds with cultures previously
unknown to the European world. The utopian construct
assumes rational forms. It creates spaces that are subject to
the control of the ratio. In its original form therefore, the
utopian thought is a western European idea, which did not
exist in other contemporary cultures. The evolutionary im-
petus is significantly shaped by the Spirit of Constructive
Doing, without, however, overstepping the natural-historical
basis of man.
The way in which the transhumanist thought deals with
the evolutionary impetus of self-preservation in the struggle
for survival is different from that in the utopian approach.
The utopian approach subscribes to the hypothesis that there
exists both an animal as well as socio-cultural nature in man.
One is socio-culturally arched, while the other has a biolog-
ical basis. Contrary to this, the transhumanist approach ex-
trapolates a state of command over the inner and outer nature
of man, which seems to enable him to reach out to his
natural-historical basis. The utopian approach did not ques-
tion the very nature of the mechanisms of the natural evolu-
tion as defined by Darwin, as long as it concerned the first
nature of man. The concept of the New Man as propagated
by this approach does not aim at accelerating one’s own
evolution by taking it in one’s own hands by adopting
scientific-technological means. However, this is true of mod-
ern transhumanism. The evolutionary self-preservation po-
tential of man attains apparent plausibility in a scientific-
technological hyper-civilisation, as we believe that we are
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capable of perceiving at least to some extent at the beginning
of the 21st century.
Natural things and artefacts in the utopian thought
and in transhumanism
As the utopian thought does not question the original evolu-
tion of the first nature of man, a distinction has been made
between natural things and artefacts since ancient times. The
Italian Enlightenment philosopher Giambattista Vico (1688–
1744) was the first to recognise their full significance [14].
His epistemological principle of “verum ipsum factum”,
which he directed against Descartes, gives rise to the division
of the term “fact” into two categories: facts that are organic
and inorganic in nature, which are predefined for man. Facts
of animate nature are the animals and plants while those of
inanimate nature are celestial bodies, stones, geological for-
mations, volcanic activities, weather patterns, etc. Artefacts
are different from these natural facts. They are created by
man and comprise cultural, historical, social, technological
and scientific phenomena. In relation to man, this means that,
being a biological emergence of the evolution, he is a natural
fact but as creator of his own artificial world where he
actually leads his life, he is also an artefact. Even though
both dimensions are non-dually integrated with each other,
they follow their own laws especially when it comes to the
sharing of information. As emphasised by Heinz Penzlin,
organic natural facts share information in a biogenetic man-
ner while socio-cultural artefacts do so in a tradigenetic
manner (compare [15, pp 3–33].
It can be concluded that the utopian thought supports the
understanding that the DNA, which multiplies by identical
replication, which is changed by mutation and passed on
from generation to generation, is the carrier of information
in biogenetic evolution. In the socio-cultural nature of man
on the other hand, the process of learning takes place sepa-
rately for individuals. As Heinz Penzlin rightly pointed out,
this process of learning is based on acquired and preserved
information, which also changes with experience, and
“which can be passed on from one to the other in a non-
genetic manner through observation and imitation, through
teaching and learning. This is called “the building of a
tradition” [15, p 22]. Transhumanism does not subscribe to
this compatibility of the dual modes of information sharing
of both intertwining dimensions of human nature, which the
utopian thought propagates. It aims at “changing the ‘first
nature’ of man with the most advanced methods from genetic
and computer engineering and robotics. The resulting impact
on the social and cultural world is rarely subjected to detailed
reflection—the expectation of meliorism is what one needs
for good health and intelligence. It is not important whether
the physical and psychological changes occur in line with the
laws of Darwinism or through technological intervention—
everything constitutes evolution” [16, p 182].
By doing away with the distinction between the biological
and socio-cultural nature of man, transhumanism does not
provide a basis for the distinction between natural things and
artefacts [17]. However, it has always played a vital role in
the utopian approach: As the archist, i.e., authority-driven,
utopian tradition shows, its architectural perceptions primar-
ily concerned the imposition of an artificial framework by
taking recourse to the basic geometric figures of the external
nature that was considered as an “enemy”. This framework is
such that its design of the ideal city is controlled by humans.
Conversely when boundaries between nature and technology
dissolve in transhumanism because both are supposedly
controlled by the same elementary parts and mechanical
forces, the boundaries between man and machine also be-
come fluid. It is here that the hiatus between both variants of
the conditio humana becomes visible. Owing to its anthro-
pological premises, the utopian thought is forced to draw on
the cultural resources of its tradigenetic past. This is the only
way to imagine a world where leading a good life is possible.
The transhumanist approach on the other hand thrives on the
eradication of the distinction between natural things and
artefacts: To the extent that transhumanism allows the merg-
ing of the concepts of man and machine, it surrenders itself to
a single resource: modern technology and its imagination
potential in the form of Science Fiction.
Only those who, like the transhumanists, ignore the dis-
tinction between the tradigenetic and biogenetic evolution
can arrive at this consequence. Opinions regarding the ac-
ceptance of this distinction tend to differ. This is why its
explanation or justification is of crucial significance. Sharing
of information in a tradigenetic manner occurs at a higher
pace than its biogenetic variant. The sharing of information
is not limited to the birth but takes place throughout the life
of a person. Moreover, the individual steps of tradigenetic
evolution are generally larger than the small changes brought
about by mutation. In contrast to mutation, the tradigenetic
learning processes occur independent of the selection condi-
tions because they can reflect on these. In this respect,
“tradigenetic evolution, unlike the biogenetic evolution, is
also reversible” [15, p 22].
The fact that the utopian and transhumanist approaches,
owing to varying anthropological premises, draw on varying
potentials when producing their variants raises a question
about the impact this distinction has on the phenomenology
of their imagination of the New Man. The quality of the
utopian construction has been set out by Plato in his
“Politeia” [2, pp 67–310] and then in a modernised form
by Thomas More in his “Utopia” [3, pp 7–110]. The core of
the classic utopian tradition is formed by notional social
models, which respond to the critical, undesirable develop-
ments in their society of origin as institutional, socio-
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economical, scientific-technological and moral alternatives
[18]. Science and technology play a central role in these
models; but they are subordinate to the concept of a “good
life” because they contribute to making it possible.
Summarised as a dictum: in the positive, utopian scenarios,
technology serves man and not the other way round.
The thrust of the original model of Science Fiction, which
is the actual source of inspiration for transhumanist visions,
is completely different. Since the times of Jules Verne, it is
not concerned with the models of “good life” in a social
order that guarantees this goal; its main purpose is the ex-
trapolation of scientific-technological developments. It does
not aim at moral and material improvement in man, but at its
perfection as long as they can be reconstructed as machines.
The “society” plays only a marginal role in providing the
material for the framework of the innovative engineer, who
expedites technological progress in a certain social situation
against possible constraints. On the one hand the utopian
construct owes its significant momentum to the critical de-
velopment of the society of origin of the respective author.
On the other hand, Science Fiction subsists on the aura of
technical potentialities, which have not been achieved yet
but which don the hypothetical appearance of being achieved
in the not too distant future.
The thematic differences between classic utopia
and transhumanism at the phenomenological level
If I am not mistaken, this varying initial situation [19, pp
144–155] of the construction of imaginary worlds in con-
nection with the divergent anthropological premises shown
gives rise to a series of structural differences between the
utopian and the transhumanist approaches at the phenome-
nological level, which can only be hinted at here (compare
[20, pp 179–194].
One: The classic tradition of utopia thrives on the reval-
uation of human work, which was granted a sub-
ordinate position in the hierarchy of values by its
forerunners, namely Plato’s “Politeia”. It is only
when the mobilisation of this resource is complete
that it considers a central prerequisite of utopia as
fulfilled: namely, the material reproduction of the
society, which evolves from “labora!” (labour) and
not from “ora!” (pray) and which therefore sees
itself as a pure human artefact. Then again, the
transhumanist New Man has long since been
emancipated from the constraints of the conflicts
with nature arising out of instrumental action. Eric
Drexler’s approach [6] has become a precedent for
this since it, inspired by Science Fiction, develops
a new technology—nanotechnology. According to
Drexler, self-replicating, nanoscaled machines and
robots, so-called “Assemblers”, are creating a gold-
en era on the earth. By specifically manipulating
atoms at the nano level, they generate unimaginable
wealth; they render human work redundant and
mark the beginning of the end of all diseases and
provide solutions for environmental problems. One
could also say that: Advanced nanotechnology
makes possible what many people dream of or have
always dreamt of: the recurrence of a paradise be-
yond the conflict with nature, which arise out of
instrumental action and are thus regarded as a curse.
Two: The classic Utopians saw themselves as avant-
gardes of the first and second industrial revolution.
But they attained their specific profile because they
also rejected the material poverty that is the by-
product of the process of industrialisation. They
believed that they could eliminate the darker sides
of industrial development by disentangling it from
its capitalistic utilitarian context and at the same
time integrating it in a socio-economical context,
whose structure promoted collective and not indi-
vidual gain. Transhumanist visionaries also see
themselves as resolute propagandists and pro-
moters of leading technologies at the start of the
21st century. However, they do not change the
socio-political set-up in which they originated.
On the contrary: the “new” society is interpreted
as the product of transhumanist innovation, for
e.g., in the categories of the “information society”
on the unchanged basis of its capitalistic and na-
tional society of origin, whose market-conforming
interest is what it explicitly aims at.
Three: In the positive scenarios presented by the classic
utopian discourse, technological innovations go
hand in hand with the moral improvement of man
and the enhancement of his ability to assume re-
sponsibility. The fact that this connection between
man’s ability to assume responsibility and scientific-
technological progress became brittle after the First
World War is an important condition for the classic
dystopias such as shown by Samjatin’s “We” [21],
Huxley’s “Brave New World” [4], or Orwell’s
“1984” [22], (compare [23, pp 97–159]). On the
other hand, the expectation of moral improvement
is of little significance in the transhumanist dis-
course. The reason for this is the belief that the
inherent necessities emerging from new technolo-
gies in any case enforce the norms that they need for
their social acceptance. Since there are no critical
corrective measures, the ethics regress to being
nothing more than a medium to achieve acceptance.
What remains is technologised determinism: Those
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who oppose it would be on the losing side. Not only
that, they would also be instrumental in slowing
down the progress of convergent technology, from
which the supposed evil forces profit: a danger,
which Eric Drexler deemed necessary to emphati-
cally warn about.
Four: The value of freedom in the classic utopian dis-
course is ambivalent. Its anarchist, i.e., authority-
free trend raised it to a crucial imperative. The
archist, i.e., authority-driven approach on the other
hand replaces it by the target value of social security.
Both variants however, advocated the material
equality of all individuals, as long as it did not turn
into egalitarianism. This option included, particular-
ly for the classic utopia, a functional elite, which
was modelled on Plato’s philosopher caste. Eugenic
measures were expected to place, for instance, not
only individual communities but the utopian com-
munity as a whole on a higher level. This horizon of
expectation does not exist in the transhumanist dis-
course. Since the new, leading technologies have
always been applied for commercial purposes, it is
foreseeable that only the rich profit from them ow-
ing to the high costs involved, because enormous
monetary resources would be used to finance the
colossal development costs of synthetic biology
instead of being used for the general health system.
The consequences are inevitable. “For instance, if
we split ourselves into several, dissimilar types
using genetic engineering, the idea of equality,
which is the basis for the entire democratic system,
would be jeopardised” [24, p 47].
Five: Before it took a historical-political turn in the mid-
dle of the 18th century, and again after the Second
World War, the classic utopian thought thrived on
the expectation that the future is open and that the
social processes can be controlled. It is only then
that the utopian credo of letting oneself be guided
by a regulative, which at least tries to aim at creat-
ing a world in which we would like to live, makes
sense. As opposed to that, the transhumanist ap-
proach assumes a post-darwinist evolution model.
“According to this, even nanotechnological devel-
opment proceeds autonomously towards a
predetermined goal, without it being lead in a dif-
ferent direction, changed or even stopped by the
external social and political influences” [17, p 92].
Protagonists of the third industrial revolution ex-
plicitly or implicitly attribute the development dy-
namics of the transhumanist approach to this tele-
ology. For them, the evolution that is influenced by
new technologies is a “part of an extensive pro-
cess”, which we have to submit to whether we “like
it or not” [25, p 111]. However, they modify the
social-darwinist approach in a crucial aspect:
according to them, the consequences of the natural
process of evolution, which, for instance, do not
exclude the possibility of hereditary diseases, can
be improved. Thus, the constructive achievement is
not, like in utopian thought, the creation of alterna-
tive societies to achieve social justice by introduc-
ing the concepts of common property and central
economic governance, but the artificial improve-
ment of the evolutionary results that is possible
because of the synergy effects of convergence tech-
nologies that are applied on humans, and in fact,
within the framework of a teleology that is related
to a visionary final outcome.
Six: The claim to validity of the classic utopian project
was that of a platonic ideal that had to sustain
without a teleological realisation guarantee. After
temporary convergence with historical philosophy
after the middle of the 18th century, this non-
teleological claim to validity was revived after the
Second World War: utopias do not consider them-
selves as the destination of history; rather, they are
notional alternatives to the undesirable develop-
ment of their societies of origin and are aware of
the fact that they can fail, as they are achieving the
opposite of the positive things they intend to
achieve. The claim to validity of the transhumanist
project is completely different. It assumes that there
is a fixed end time of a condition of the human race
without work, without poverty and without envi-
ronmental problems, without diseases and the vir-
tual immortality of every individual. The driving
force of the transformation strategy for achieving
this goal is the automatic dynamics, which results
from the interdisciplinary association of nano, bio,
neuro and information technologies, and which
subjects technologically well-equipped human be-
ings to a second evolution, which is controlled by
them.
Seven: It is true that the idea of human breeding is not
unknown to the classic utopian discourse. It plays
a substantial role in Plato’s “Politeia” as well as in
Campanella’s “City of the Sun” [26, pp 111–168].
Would it not be possible that the idea of human
breeding would build a bridge between the utopian
and the transhumanist thought? Quite apart from
the fact that all utopias of the classic tradition dis-
tanced themselves from such an eugenic approach
of “Human Enhancement” after the Second World
War, the transhumanist intention supports another
perspective. Its aim is to improve man by modify-
ing the human body through technical means: be it
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genetic manipulation that is made possible by tech-
nology or the man–machine interaction. On the
other hand, however, artificial selective breeding,
on which Plato and Campanella fall back, is con-
trolled by humans with the aim of genetically cul-
tivating certain characteristics through the pairing
of selected individuals. The Human-Enhancement
technology does not play any role in the classic
form of breeding that is manipulated by man. This
is because an external intervention in the human
body does not take place using technical means.
While the selection is manipulated, the inner bio-
logical transmission of the gene is not.
Eight: In recent publications one of the main representa-
tives of classic political utopia, Francis Bacon, has
been pronounced as the mentor of modern
transhumanism. In his “New Atlantis”, he describes
“not only a political and social order that was
governed by wise men and scientists and supported
by exceedingly congenial, ethical and dignified
citizens, but also practices for the reinvention of
man” [27, p 115]. But on careful reading of the text,
it is evident that Bacon speaks of animal experi-
ments Bacon [28, p 368]. The application of their
results on humans prevents illness and not encour-
ages the technological improvement of man beyond
therapy. Bacon explicitly points out that these exper-
iments serve the purpose of protecting the human
body (we may take light what may be wrought upon
the body of men)” (p 368). Moreover, instead of
technical enhanced men in transhuman perspective
Bacon speaks rather of the imitations of living crea-
tures “by images of men, beasts, birds, fishes, and
serpents” (p 375). Evidently, these bionic experi-
ments serve the development of machines (p 375),
which, characterised by uniformity and refinement,
are used for dominating nature (p 364f). Moreover,
Bacon explicitly points out that scientific innova-
tions can be published only when their responsible
application is ensured (p 377): an ethical condition,
which does not exist in the transhumanist discourse.
An insight into the future of the classic, political utopia
If the classic, political utopia intends to have a future, it must
find ways and means to successfully resist the takeover
attempts by transhumanist improvements in man. The pros-
pects of achieving this goal are not slim. I would like to state
two reasons for this. If we offset the above-mentioned
phenomenological and anthropological differences against
the congruities of both approaches in their acceptance of
scientific laws, the scientific-technological avant-garde
claim and of the volition to dominate nature (compare [20,
pp 182], everything speaks in favour of a paradigmatic
distinction between the utopian and transhumanist ap-
proaches. This distinction is also supported by the fact that
utopian thought demands an optimisation of man while
transhumanism advocates his conquest. Despite this, those
who decide to subsume both approaches under one term
“utopia”, blur its boundaries and abandon it to such arbitrar-
iness in its application in concrete phenomena that is com-
parable with a capitulation of the transhumanist challenge.
The second reason is of no less significance. The turn of
the millennium has seen a series of utopian novels being
written, which have caused a sensation and have found
considerable resonance in the literary circles and in the
feature articles of popular newspapers. I would like to cite
a few examples: Bettina Obrecht’s “Designer-Baby” [29],
Michel Houellebecq’s “La possibilité d’une île” [30], Kazuo
Ishiguro’s “Never Let Me Go” [31], Juli Zeh’s “Corpus
Delicti” [32] and Richard Powers’ “Generosity” [33]. These
novels follow the tradition of the classic dystopias, as
moulded by Samjatin’s “We”, Huxley’s “Brave New World”
and Orwell’s “1984”. They build for the reader a
transhumanist world in the same way and with the same
intention as Samjatin, Huxley and Orwell intended to warn
their public about the dangers of totalitarianism. In both
cases, the authors’ works presented didactic plays about the
world that we may not want to have when we cling to our
human nature.
In this sense, the utopia researcher Wilhelm Voßkamp
warns about the transhumanist transformation of the human
resource into a digital programme. He considers the depar-
ture from the traditional humanist image of man in order to
adopt a scientific programme as a departure from the tradi-
tional utopian thought. His final speech therefore “speaks, in
principle, of broadening the critical faculties and perceptual
abilities of man in light of such developments. How can one
conceive a new, advanced image of man if it does not
presuppose the fact that death should be understood as mere-
ly an unpleasant affair that needs to be eliminated? Immor-
tality should not become a utopian project; the arts should
not be replaced by technological sciences. And with that we
are on the path that necessitates an urgent renaissance of
ideas related to the individual” [34, p 84].
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